What the IPv4 and IPv6 Readiness Checker Reviews
This checker brings several public technical signals into one report. It identifies the Regional Internet Registry associated with the prefix, reads available registration records, finds current BGP origin ASNs, looks for matching IRR route or route6 objects, validates each visible origin against RPKI, and measures whether the prefix is visible to RIPE RIS peers. It also highlights obvious inconsistencies, such as a route appearing in BGP without a matching IRR object, an RPKI-invalid origin, multiple current origins, or a missing public abuse contact.
The result is designed for early due diligence before an IPv4 transfer, IPv6 resource review, network migration, BGP onboarding, or sponsoring-LIR discussion. A high score means that the public technical data appears comparatively complete and consistent at the time of the query. It does not guarantee that a Regional Internet Registry will approve a transfer, that a resource is legally available, or that the address space has no historical reputation problem.
Registry and Registration Objects
The authoritative RIR is an important first step because policies, transfer procedures, documentation requirements, and resource statuses differ between RIPE NCC, ARIN, APNIC, LACNIC, and AFRINIC. The registration section displays available fields such as inetnum or inet6num, netname, organisation reference, country, status, source, and last-modified date. Registration data should be reviewed together with contracts and current RIR records; it is not, by itself, a legal ownership certificate.
Origin ASN, Route Objects and BGP Visibility
The origin ASN is the Autonomous System currently originating the prefix in BGP. An IRR route object for IPv4 or route6 object for IPv6 documents routing intent and is often used by transit providers when building prefix filters. Live BGP visibility is a different signal: it shows whether the route is actually observed by RIPE RIS peers. A route object does not prove live visibility, and live visibility does not prove that the announcement is authorized. The strongest operational position is normally a consistent relationship between registration, IRR, BGP and RPKI data.
RPKI ROA Validation
RPKI provides cryptographic route-origin authorization. For each current origin ASN found in public BGP data, the checker asks a validator whether the prefix and origin are valid, invalid, or not found. A valid result means an applicable ROA authorizes the origin and prefix length. An invalid result requires urgent review because networks performing route-origin validation may reject or de-prioritize the announcement. A not-found result means no applicable ROA was found; it is not the same as invalid, but creating an appropriate ROA is a widely recommended routing-security practice.
What “Reputation” Means in This Report
The reputation section evaluates only basic public operational hygiene, such as whether an authoritative abuse contact is available and whether registry and routing records are consistent. It does not query commercial fraud databases, email blocklists, residential-proxy classifications, or every third-party threat-intelligence source. Before purchasing, leasing, or accepting an IPv4 block, conduct separate spam, malware, geolocation, prior-use, and platform-specific reputation checks. IPv6 reputation should also be assessed according to the intended workload and announcement history.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can this checker confirm that an IPv4 block is transferable?
No. It reviews public technical data only. Transfer eligibility depends on the authoritative RIR, resource status, policy, contractual rights, documentation, and approval process.
Does the checker support IPv6 prefixes?
Yes. Enter an IPv6 prefix in CIDR notation, such as 2001:67c:2e8::/48. The tool reviews registration, origin ASN, route6, RPKI and BGP visibility where public data is available.
Is an RPKI not-found result the same as invalid?
No. Not found means no applicable ROA was located. Invalid means a ROA exists but does not authorize the observed origin or prefix length.
Why can public data sources disagree?
Registry, IRR, BGP and RPKI systems serve different purposes and update at different times. A mismatch may indicate a transition, stale object, configuration error, unauthorized announcement, or temporary data delay and should be investigated.